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The Demand Side of Social Protection 
 








In fragile states, social protection programmes are often a kaleidoscope of projects 
financed and implemented by a variety of donors, government agencies and NGOs. 
Such an environment does not foster a strong sense of ownership by beneficiaries, 
which weakens the likelihood of sustainability in the absence of donor interest or 
government commitment. Loosening demand-side constraints may provide incentive to 
sustain social progress, but it is unclear what political or social structures can effectively 
facilitate voice in fragile states. Cambodia’s unusual social protection trajectory offers 
some insight by presenting an example where labour rights has made substantial 
progress while all other protections lag. We assess whether the changed external 
environment might facilitate activism in other areas of social protection. Our analysis 
suggests that using an island of excellence to build institutions that open political space 
for activism can be a successful strategy in states where governments are unable or 
unwilling to provide comprehensive social protection systems. 
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1 Introduction 
In less than a decade, Cambodia’s garment sector has been transformed from a cluster 
of sweatshops where human rights violations were pervasive, into hundreds of 
monitored factories that are more likely to comply with labour law than they are to 
engage in forced overtime. In 2010, the ILO-affiliated monitoring mechanism found 
that 98 per cent of surveyed factories neither interfered with freedom of association nor 
engaged in anti-union activity.1 This rapid evolution has not only spurred sustained 
growth in foreign investment, but also a reframing of the international perception of 
Cambodia from a dangerous hinterland to a viable production site for ethically branded 
clothes.  
 
Despite these advances, overall indicators of social protection for Cambodia remain 
among the world’s worst.2 The reality is that the great strides that have been made in 
worker rights are effectively limited to one manufacturing sector and one category of 
rights. Beyond the garment sector, worker rights violations are a regular occurrence and 
social protection is limited in both coverage and diversity. In part, this rights gap 
reflects the roadblocks to domestic drivers, such as social movements, that can be a 
catalyst for the creation of sustainable social policies. 
 
The challenges of creating effective social protection systems in poor countries are 
significant. Financing is a challenge when much of the population would be covered. 
Targeting the neediest is difficult in the absence of national social surveys. And while 
there have been notable innovations in social protection instruments around the world, 
successful interventions may not easily scale up and local adaption takes time.  
 
But even if all of these supply-side issues are solved, it will not ensure the continuity of 
a social protection system in the long run. Dedicated spaces for state-society interaction 
are needed.3 This is because fundamentally, social protection policies are a 
redistributive decision made by the state. And if the state is not open or subject to 
pressure to redistribute, there is no incentive to continue income transfers once donor 
interest or assistance runs out.4 As the ILO points out, every government can afford 
social protection, it is just a matter of political will (Pal et al. 2005). 
 
The political calculus a state undertakes in the decision to redistribute is largely a 
function of variables that moderate or facilitate the translation of domestic demand 
(Grossman and Helpman 2001). These can include the type of electoral institution, the 
degree of partisanship, and societal support for different interest groups. Social 
movements have been shown to be a powerful vehicle for demand transmission. But in 
                                                 
1  Better Factories Cambodia (2010) ‘Twenty Fourth Synthesis Report on Working Conditions in 
Cambodia’s Garment Sector’, 30 April 2010. 
2  Social Protection refers to social policies that address risk and vulnerability and which have a focus on 
reaching the poorest in society (Conway et al. 2000)  
3  The importance of political spaces for negotiation of protection has been recognized, but until now, 
primarily limited to the literature on migration and social protection (see e.g. Sabates-Wheeler and 
MacAuslan 2007). 
4  As Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) point out, redistributive policies are often seen largely as a useful 
tool to maintain government power, which suggests that unless the needy are politically active, social 
protection will not favour them.    2
fragile states, the divergence between formal rules and actual practice creates substantial 
additional challenges for the ability of citizens to engage with the state (Earle 2011).  
From the perspective of the social movement, its ability to achieve its objectives is 
dependent on the political opportunity structure that is in place. However, while it is 
clear that the policy context matters, there is little agreement in the literature as to 
exactly which institutions or norms are most likely to facilitate the translation of 
demand into supply (see e.g. Mares and Carnes 2009). Both donors and academia have 
recognized the need to better understand the politics behind social protection but this 
remains in the early stages (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2011). 
 
It is here that the case of Cambodia can yield the most interesting insights. The 
institutions and norms that define the new labour regime changed the political context 
facing other social movements. Because of existing evidence that protections stemming 
from local demand rather than donor projects are more likely to succeed (Devereaux 
and White 2010), the extent to which other actors use the spaces created by labour can 
inform donor efforts to promote sustainable social protection systems.  
 
Section 2 presents the theoretical context that frames our approach to social protection 
and social movements. Section 3 looks at the gaps that exist in the current social 
protection system in Cambodia. Section 4 then looks at the story behind labour’s ability 
to achieve high-quality and sustainable social protections. Section 5 details the 
institutions labour created, and Section 6 looks at whether they have been used by 
activists in other sectors. Section 7 concludes.  
2  The power of political opportunity  
The question of which features of the political context facilitate social protection has 
been explored through two different orientations. These include the government 
perspective—how the structure responds to interest group actions (see e.g. Giugni 1998) 
and the social demand perspective—how the structure influences the activities of 
interest groups (see e.g. Tilly 1995; Meyer 2004). Because of the unique structure of 
Cambodian social protection, we are able to draw from both traditions. The story of 
labour’s success gives us insight into how the policy context was affected by the actions 
of forces outside the government. The subsequent question about the potential for the 
rise of new activism is a story about how this revised context might be expected to 
affect the development of subsequent social movements.  
 
Our focus on the environment in which social movements operate rather than features of 
the movements themselves results from our interest in fragile states. Fragility is a 
condition defined both by characteristics of assistance and characteristics of the state. In 
fragile states such as Cambodia, the government by definition ‘cannot or will not 
provide basic services’ such as social protection.5 In these cases, the channels through 
which interest group demand is translated into government action may not exist or 
function properly. Interest groups, in these cases, much forge their own channels for 
influence. It is this observation that motivates this paper. 
 
                                                 
5  According to the DFID website, ‘fragile states are countries where the government cannot or will not 
deliver its basic functions to the majority of its people, including the poor’.   3
The conceptual framework we adopt in this paper is drawn from sociological 
perspectives on social movements, supplemented by the development literature on 
fragile states. The political process approach to social movements explores how they 
might alter political opportunities in a way that promotes their chances of success. The 
literature on movement-to-movement spillovers offers a way to understand how nascent 
interest groups might be moved to action given the way that earlier movements altered 
the social and political context.  
2.1  Changing the political opportunity structure 
The political context in which a movement operates is an important determinant of the 
development and outcomes of social movements (e.g., Davis et al. 2005). The so-called 
political opportunity structure is the set of institutional and societal constraints that 
determine the development and strategic decisions made by social movements.6 It can 
consist of elements such as access to the political system, elite division, elite allies, and 
degree of state repression (McAdam 1996), though there exist a great variety of 
conceptualizations.7 
 
The features of this structure that may limit opportunities are particularly common in 
fragile states, where state-society relations are often contentious. In fragile states, there 
is often a divergence between formal rules and actual practice, and political elites may 
see little benefit from engaging with citizens (Haider 2010). Where there has been 
violence, movements may be further hindered by damaged social networks, uncertainty 
about which state actor is in control and should be the target of lobbying, and a lack of 
qualified personnel to engage in negotiations (Earle 2011). 
 
Identifying which features of the political context might be expected to promote spaces 
for activism is a challenge even within countries. Different types of movements are able 
to adapt to different conditions—for example, the pro-life and the pro-choice 
movements in the United States both developed in the same political environment but 
follow very different mobilizing structures (McCarthy 1987). An unwelcoming political 
structure might prevent some movements from forming, while being the source of 
motivation for others.  
 
We attempt to circumvent this identification problem in our paper by offering a country 
case study where the field for activism around social protection is broad, but has so far 
moved in only one sector. This way we can assess how a particular set of institutions 
and norms were changed and whether the resulting context should contribute to 
organizing around related issues. Here, we seek to contribute to the literature on social 
movement outcomes. Giugni (1998) suggests that there has been an overly-narrow focus 
on policy outcomes, but that indirect and unintended consequences can be just as 
important.  
 
                                                 
6  Tarrow (1996) offers a definition of ‘Consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national—
signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal 
resources to form social movements’. 
7  The political process perspective has been building since Tilly (1978) and Eisinger (1973) but there 
remains no consensus in the literature about exactly what constitutes this structure (for a good 
summary of the debates and critiques see Meyer (2004)).   4
Section 5 in particular uses this framework to orient our discussion about the changes 
that were introduced to the political opportunity structure facing movements around 
social protection both before and after the changes wrought by labour rights activism. 
Specifically, we will focus on the importance of international alliances, changes to 
existing state structures, and the introduction of new spaces for state-society interaction. 
2.2 Movement-to-movement  spillovers 
Our interest in this paper goes beyond simply describing the changes wrought by a 
successful social movement. And extend to exploring if these changes might positively 
impact subsequent movements. This is the key question for social protection outcomes 
because if changes in the political opportunity structure are accessible only to the 
movement that changed them, then we cannot conclude that these changes are helpful 
for social protection and should be encouraged. 
 
To understand whether, or the extent to which, other movements might benefit from 
changes engendered by previous activism, we turn to the literature on spillovers. This 
literature is concerned with the way that distinct social movements interact with one 
another. It recognizes that they are not self-contained and often members identify with 
multiple groups in ways that can facilitate learning. In fact, Rojas and Heaney (2008) 
suggest that in order for a movement to be successful it must be able to benefit from 
spillovers from others. 
 
Meyer and Whittier (1994) suggest the presence of spillovers is ubiquitous because 
movements often have goals that go beyond their direct policy objectives. Using Meyer 
and Whittier’s framework, we explore in detail three transmission channels through 
which we would expect the labour rights experience to impact new activism. These are 
overlapping communities, shared personnel and changes in the external environment. 
Underpinning each of these channels is the consideration that the labour rights system 
that rose in Cambodia is seen globally as one of the great turnarounds in social 
protection. Landmark changes such as these can have a long-lasting and exaggerated 
impact on activism through their signal about opportunity (Meyer and Boutcher 2007). 
Starting from these three channels, in Section 6 we are able to explore both how these 
channels might work and also if there is evidence that these channels are used by other 
groups. But first we turn to look at the existing social protection situation in Cambodia.  
3  Spaces for activism: the supply of social protection in Cambodia 
Before we can assess the extent to which new state-society spaces created by labour are 
useful for non-labour activism, we need to understand whether there is incentive for 
new social movements to coalesce around social protection. In this section, we describe 
three dimensions of social protection in Cambodia—legislation, financing and 
implementation.8  
 
There is a strong legal basis for a functioning system. However, financing is almost 
wholly driven by foreign assistance. In the absence of government co-ordination, this 
has resulted in a lopsided protection system where legislation has not been 
                                                 
8  Harvey et al. (2007) call the range of instruments, financing and delivery capacity the ‘three essential 
challenges’ in social protection design.   5
operationalized in many sectors. This situation is typical of fragile states where the 
government is able to create the institutions of a state, but subsequently unable to carry 
out the functions of those institutions (Pritchett and de Weijer 2010). And it is here 
where social movements can have the greatest impact.  
 
In comparison to other Asian countries, Cambodia scores relatively poorly in the Asian 
Development Bank’s Social Protection Index (see Figure 1). Cambodia has similar 
coverage indicators to other low-income countries in Asia, but lower expenditure (Tola 
2007). Targeting of the poor is relatively good with 60 per cent of social protection 
spending going to them. 
 
Figure 1: Social Protection Index (SPI) scores for selected Asian countries 
 
Source: ADB (2008). 
 
The limited reach of Cambodia’s social protection programmes is not unexpected in a 
country with pervasive poverty, high agricultural employment, continuing amputees 
from landmines and widespread child malnutrition. However in the sections that follow 
we will see that while resources devoted to social programmes are growing, the 
percentage of the population that is covered remains low and some vulnerable 
populations have not been targeted at all.  
3.1 Legislation 
While Cambodia scores poorly on social protection indicators, this does not reflect a 
lack of official recognition that vulnerable populations need protection. The Cambodian 
constitution lays down a fairly comprehensive baseline for the country’s social 
protection regime. It provides a number of mandates for social assistance and social 
security (for details, see Sann 2010; Chan and Ear 2004). While these elements identify 
several target populations, implementation has been largely limited to formal sector 
measures which are of limited application in a country where 85 per cent of the 
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Figure 2: Constitutional elements related to social protection 
 
Article Target  population  Rights 
36 
All 
Right to choose any employment 
Shall receive equal pay for equal work 
Right to obtain social security and other social 
benefits as determined by law 
Right to form and to be member of trade unions 
72 
The health of the people shall be guaranteed. The 
State shall give full consideration to disease 
prevention and medical treatment 
46 
Women 
Commerce of human beings, exploitation by 
prostitution and obscenity which affect the 
reputation of women shall be prohibited 
Women (esp. rural) 
State and society shall provide opportunities to 
women ... so they can get employment, medical 
care, send their children to school and have decent 
living conditions 
73  Women (and 
children) 
State shall establish nurseries and help support 
women and children who have inadequate support 
48 Children 
State shall protect the rights of children ... the right 
to life, education, protection during wartime and 
from economic or sexual exploitation 
72 Poor  citizens  Shall receive free medical consultation in public 
hospitals, infirmaries and maternities 
74  The disabled and families 
of those killed in combat 
The state shall assist 
75 Workers  The state shall establish a social security system 
 
Source: Author’s assessment. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that while many of the elements confer rights that citizens can 
demand, others use the legally ambiguous promise of ‘shall’ and require additional 
legislation before they become a source of entitlement. In some cases, this has been 
codified by law, for example, the law on social security schemes was passed in 2002 in 
fulfillment of Article 75. However, others such as the promise of opportunities to rural 
women, have not yet been officially drafted into the legal structure. 
 
The absence of constitutional protection for the elderly is illustrative of the types of 
gaps in protection that are embedded in the Cambodian system. The elderly are a target 
group in most social protection systems. But in Cambodia, care for the elderly is 
explicitly not the provision of the state. Article 48 of the constitution states that 
‘children shall have the duty to take care of their elderly mother and father according to 
Khmer traditions’. 
 
In an effort to promote both operationalization of existing constitutional protections and 
respond to donor concerns, the Cambodian government has articulated a National Social 
Protection Strategy (NSPS), which was drafted by and will be co-ordinated by the   7
Council for Agricultural and Rural Development.9 The NSPS consists of the four pillars 
(Figure 3) and is considered to be a part of the two overarching national development 
plans that lay out the government’s priorities—the National Strategic Development Plan 
and the Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency.  
 
Figure 3: Scope of the Cambodian National Social Protection Strategy 
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Source: Council for Agricultural and Rural Development. 
 
The expected approval of this strategy in tandem with the passage of several key laws 
shows that the government is continuing to operationalize mandates for social 
protection in the Constitution. The existence of formal legislated rights gives citizens—
to the extent that they are aware of their rights—a justification of their demands for 
protection. They are not asking for anything the government has not already recognized 
that it should be providing. But there remains a long way to go. A closer look at the 
types of programmes that are in place today reveals the imbalance in funding and 
attention. 
3.2 Financing 
Financing social protection in fragile states is often overwhelmingly provided by 
donors, which often results in uneven capacity. This is the case in Cambodia where the 
majority of funding is provided by its development partners (Braithwaite et al. 2009). 
The high proportion of foreign funding both ensures that some additional groups are 
being protected, but also distances the state from being considered as the decision maker 
by activist groups. 
 
Fragile states often spend little on social sectors because of their inability to collect 
taxes and the preference to spend what little is collected on military and security 
spending or lavish ministerial benefits. Cambodia for example has very low tax 
revenues—only 11 per cent of GDP is collected, as opposed to 20 per cent in other 
developing countries (UNESCAP 2010).10  
 
The results of donor-dependence are that donor interests can drive social spending 
rather than fund it. RBMG (2010) identified Cambodia’s development partners as the 
key actors in aid decision-making, although this is slowly changing. In 2002, the 
Cambodian government designated four ‘priority ministries’—health, education, 
                                                 
9  The NSPS has to pass through four stages of approval before it is officially endorsed by the 
Cambodian government. As of this writing, the first three are complete and the fourth stage is 
tentatively scheduled for February 2011.  
10 In 2009, 3.1 per cent of Cambodia’s national budget was dedicated to social ministries, as opposed to 
4.3 per cent for the Asian region.   8
agriculture and rural development. We can see in Figure 4 that donors have favoured 
health and education, and also public works. Other social protection ministries, such as 
the Ministry of Social Affairs, receive little attention. This is reflected also by 
government spending. According to the World Bank (2006), in 2002 the government of 
Cambodia provided only 5 per cent of what donors and NGOs contribute to the Ministry 
of Rural Development.  
 
Uneven support for ministries involved in social protection also exacerbates inequalities 
among beneficiaries. If we unpack Cambodian government spending on social 
protection, more than two-thirds of expenditures are on micro-credit loans and social 
insurance with only one-third of Cambodia’s very limited social protection spending left 
for all of the other programmes. The coverage component reveals that of the seven 
priority groups, four (the elderly, the sick, the disabled, and the unemployed) have less 
than 10 per cent coverage, and the highest coverage for a needy group only reaches 45 
per cent (for children with special needs).  
 
The way in which social protection is financed in Cambodia (and many other fragile 
states) can distance the state from social activism. Donor dependence ensures that 
beneficiaries cannot demand more services of the state in those sectors since they are 
not provided by the state.  
3.3 Implementation   
Part of the reason that health and education are relatively over-funded in Cambodia is 
because these are the two areas where some successful programmes have been 
developed. Health equity funds, for example, are considered to be well-developed even 
in comparison to other countries (Annear 2008). These provide resources to compensate 
health facilities for providing free services to the poor. ‘Scholarship for the Poor’ is 
another successful programme that was initiated in 2006 and one evaluation suggests 
that it has increased enrolment of the poor by 20 per cent (Filmer and Schady 2009). 
Success generates a positive funding—implementation cycle that sustains such 
programmes.  
 
Beyond favoured sectors, implementation has proved to be a problem in almost all other 
sectors. While the most well-established social protection programmes are those which 
protect public sector workers, non-contributory programmes are relatively 
underdeveloped.  
 
The gaps in social protection coverage caused by uneven financing are exacerbated by 
inefficient use of available resources. For countries where funding constraints are 
binding, the use of targeted programmes can increase resource efficiency by allocating 
greater benefits to a more restricted set of recipients. Until recently, targeting in 
Cambodia had been done on an ad hoc basis by whichever agency was disbursing funds. 
In 2006, the Ministry of Planning with the help of German funding, introduced the ID 
Poor Programme to identify poor households in rural villages. This has made inroads by 
completing surveys of more than 5,000 villages in eleven provinces with partner 
organizations extending this to other provinces.11 
                                                 
11 From Ministry of Planning Website 2011.   9







































Lack of implementation comes from a combination of competing priorities and also a 
lack of co-ordination within the government. As of 2010, there was no single ministry 
or group tasked with co-ordinating such a system. In addition, programmes are spread 
across different ministries, each with different objectives, resources and constituencies. 
This makes multi-donor pooled funding difficult.12 As Figure 5 illustrates, the 
ministries with the greatest resources are largely those which do not target specific 
vulnerable groups, which can allow programmes to ignore needy groups.  
 
Figure 5: Ministries involved in social protection disbursements 
 




Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth 
Rehabilitation 
Civil servants, veterans, homeless and 
destitute, victims of trafficking, children, the 
disabled, those affected by natural disasters 
Labour and Vocational Training  Private sector 




Rural Development  Rural population 
Education, Youth and Sport  Children 
Planning (all) 
Public Works and Transportation  (all) 
Water Resources and 
Meteorology  (all) 
 
Source: Sann (2010). 
 
In this section, we highlighted the sources and causes of the gaps in social protection 
coverage in Cambodia that may serve as points of activism. While formal legislation 
supporting social protection is fairly comprehensive, donors favour ministries that do 
not target particular populations and the government favours entrenched public sector 
interest groups. This leaves many important intended beneficiaries—such as women or 
rural workers—uncovered. 
 
Even in the face of these challenges, the labour rights regime in the garment sector has 
managed to target workers, fund on-going factory inspections and build permanent 
institutions. In the next section, we turn to this case and seek to understand how—given 
the limitations in social protection more broadly—did labour rights move so far ahead of 
other forms of protection so quickly?  
4  The success of labour rights  
The story of how Cambodia’s labour rights regime moved so far ahead of other social 
protections begins with the design of its current labour law. In preparation for the 
country’s first post-conflict elections, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) helped to construct a domestic legal framework which covered some labour 
regulations; but which was largely seen as politically-oriented and inefficient (Hughs 
1996). In 1996, the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor and Veterans Affairs was 
established and tasked with rewriting the existing labour law in conjunction with the 
                                                 
12 A Multi-donor Support Programme for Aid Co-ordination has been established, and all donors 
recognize the need for government ownership of programmes. However, a 2008 monitoring survey 
showed that only 44 out of 358 donor missions were co-ordinated (cited in RBMG 2010).   11
ILO, French Labor Ministry and an American labour group.13 The resulting 1997 labour 
law elevated existing regulations to the level of international standards of labour and 
worker rights.  
 
At that time, the labour rights regime that prevailed in Cambodia reflected the state of 
the social protection system in general. A legal framework existed which technically 
met international standards, but implementation and enforcement was almost non-
existent. When this author conducted garment factory inspections in the late 1990s, 
many owners expressed some surprise that a labour law even existed. And when 
presented with it, they often promised future compliance with the understanding that 
violations were tolerated and compliance was not expected by the labour ministry. 
 
Cambodia’s progressive new law alone proved unconvincing to global buyers who were 
concerned with labour rights. In 1998, an American garment factory owner had 
petitioned the Walt Disney Company to source from his Phnom Penh factory. His 
selling point was that a new labour law had been designed and implemented, and he 
could show that his factory met the requirements of that law and additionally had the 
best paid workers in the sector. Despite his efforts, the buyer explained that the 
reputation of Cambodia as a country where worker rights were regularly violated meant 
that they would not source from any factory there regardless of their credentials.14 
 
The timing of Cambodia’s new labour law coincided with an explosion of global anti-
sweatshop activism. Increasing publicity of child labour and other worker rights abuses 
in factories in developing countries that supplied products to international brands 
mobilized activists to campaign for corporate responsibility and spurred a global trend 
towards ethical consumerism.15 Cambodian factories were caught up in the publicity 
through their production for some of the buyers being vilified in the international press. 
 
The unexpected mechanism that changed the labour rights regime for garment workers 
was an obscure tariff preference conferred by the United States called the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP). While it did not cover garments, it did require beneficiary 
countries to show that they respected labour rights in order to remain eligible.16 In 
1998, spurred by the global anti-sweatshop publicity and the pervasiveness of ongoing 
abuses, the AFL-CIO petitioned the US government to withdraw Cambodia’s GSP 
eligibility based on evidence of violations of the labour rights eligibility provisions.  
 
The submission of the petition led to a flurry of lobbying in Washington and publicity-
generating strikes in Cambodian factories. Yet the petition itself did not cause any 
changes to GSP treatment. Instead, it prompted a coalition of like-minded government 
officials and labour interest groups to design an entirely new bilateral trade regime that 
                                                 
13 At that time, the AFL-CIO affiliated labour group was known as the Asian American Free Labor 
Institute (AAFLI), but in 1997 it was consolidated along with other regional groups by the AFL-CIO 
into the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS). 
14  Author’s interview with a factory owner and follow up, June 1998. See also, 
http://corporate.disney.go.com/corporate/cambodia_supporting.html 
15 The ability of a social movement to link to international debates has been identified as an important 
determinant of success particularly in fragile states (Earle 2011). Della Porta and Tarrow (2005) call 
this the multilevel opportunity structure. 
16 Specifically, it required that in the designation of a beneficiary country, it must be taken into account: 
‘whether such country has taken or is taking steps to give to workers internationally recognized 
worker rights’.   12
explicitly linked labour rights and garment manufacturing (see DiCaprio 2005 for a 
discussion). The result was the 1999 Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, 
Manmade Fiber, Non-Cotton Vegetable Fiber and Silk Blend Textiles and Textile 
Products Between the Government of the United States of America and the Royal 
Government of Cambodia (hereafter, the Bilateral Textile Agreement). It was not until 
the conclusion of this agreement that Cambodia’s labour law was translated into de 
facto changes in working conditions (Guimbert 2010). 
 
The regime change catalyzed by the petition was facilitated by three characteristics of 
the international economy. The first was that the United States was Cambodia’s most 
important export market. This meant that the Cambodian government was sensitive to 
demands made by the US Government. The second was that the Cambodian 
government saw the GSP as an important signal to potential investors that Cambodia 
was a legitimate production site. The third was that international trade in textiles and 
apparel was largely governed by a quota system known as the Multi-Fiber Agreement 
(MFA). Under this regime, export markets, such as the United States could choose to 
change these levels at any time. Any change in quota levels would give manufacturers a 
price advantage over other countries that also exported to the United States.  
 
The Bilateral Textile Agreement was unique because it offered Cambodia the incentive 
of increased quota caps if the country could show that producers substantially comply 
with Cambodian labour law. This recognized that a satisfactory labour law existed, and 
that the challenge was enforcement. After almost two years of negotiations, the United 
States convinced the ILO to oversee a monitoring mechanism and the precursor to what 
is now known as ‘Better Factories Cambodia’ began operation in 2001. In countries 
with a more diversified export base, such an agreement would have had a more limited 
impact. Cambodia was an unusual case where the clothing industry completely 
dominated manufacturing exports.17  
 
The formal agreement expired with the end of the international quota system in 2005. 
But the monitoring programme continues today under the multi-stakeholder Better 
Factories Cambodia (BFC) programme. Both the government of Cambodia and the 
manufacturing association supported this because they recognize the benefits to be 
gained from being able to verify labour standards for branded apparel companies that 
are sensitive working conditions in their suppliers. It is this ability that attracts 
companies like Disney and the GAP, which explicitly brand their clothing as socially 
responsible, to buy from Cambodia.18 
 
Beyond domestic implications of the factory monitoring programme, in 2006 the ILO in 
conjunction with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) decided to extend the 
BFC concept to other countries under the Better Work Programme. So far, pilot 
programmes have been introduced in Vietnam, Jordan, Haiti, and Lesotho.   
Other programmes are coming on line in Indonesia and Nicaragua. Like Cambodia, 
these programmes are largely focused on the garment sector, however, the greater vision 
                                                 
17 As Beresford (2009) points out, from 2001-06 clothing took a 95 per cent share of Cambodia’s 
exports. 
18 Salinger et al. (2005) notes that as much as one-third of Cambodia garment exports were destined for 
the GAP.   13
is to become more cross-sectoral.19 Evaluations conclude that the BFC programme has 
designed a good blueprint, though it is not without problems (see e.g. Hall 2010). 
 
Today, Cambodia’s worker rights regime in the garment sector no longer mirrors the 
shortcomings of the broader social protection system. But as in any heavily aid-
dependent country, the changes can only be deemed a success if they have become 
embedded in the domestic governance structure. In the next section we look at whether 
this experience has opened up any political space for citizens to demand the rights to 
which they are entitled. We measure this in the extent to which the labour movement 
has created institutions and norms that can be used for purposes beyond labour rights. 
5  Changes labour made to the political opportunity structure 
The BFC sought to introduce political space in Cambodia’s labour governance structure 
in two ways—by creating institutions that would give effect to the labour law, and by 
empowering workers to use them.20 In this section, we look at how these two goals 
were accomplished, and whether, ten years later and after the official expiration of the 
programme, they have had a sustained impact. In addition, we evaluate both the 
institutions and norms that developed around the labour governance programme in 
terms of their potential to have spillovers into other types of rights and other sectors.  
5.1  Institutions for rights enforcement 
By creating or improving institutions that would give effect to the existing labour law, 
the BFC programme was attempting to bridge the implementation gap created by the 
government’s failure to enforce its own legislation. Such gaps are typical in fragile 
states where resource constrained governments are often unwilling to divert resources to 
rights enforcement. In Cambodia, the labour law offered a solid framework on which to 
build a strong governance structure, but before the BFC was introduced, it was only 
being applied to promote labour peace for smooth production.21 The BFC programme 
approached the institution-building problem from three angles. First, a monitoring 
mechanism was designed to address information asymmetries that existed between 
factory owners and the labour ministry. Second, an Arbitration Council was established 
to process purported violations. And third, it attempted to increase stakeholder 
participation by loosening constraints on collective bargaining.22 
 
The monitoring mechanism introduced by the project was the core element in extending 
enforcement of the existing legal structure. Garment factories are often highly secure 
areas and beyond the assurances of owners, it was difficult to know if labour regulations 
were followed. The ILO created a tripartite committee that engaged all stakeholders in 
                                                 
19 Interview with Tuomo Poutainen, BFC, November 2010.  
20 This was in response to the Bilateral Textile Agreements requirement to ‘to foster transparency in the 
administration of labour law, promote compliance with, and effective enforcement of, existing labour 
law, and promote the general labour rights embodied in the Cambodian labor code’ (para. 10(A)). 
21 In the latter 1990s, the Cambodia government was well-aware of the importance of this export sector 
and worked closely with the manufacturers to ensure the conditions for continuous production were 
met. During this author’s factory inspections, factories where the labour law was applied were almost 
exclusively those where workers had resorted to violence in response to abuses. 
22 The BFC actually set out five objectives overall, which are distilled here to three. See ILO (2001) for 
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the monitoring process. Every year a sample of Cambodia’s garment factories were 
visited, workers were interviewed, and an annual synthesis report was produced. These 
reports produced the information needed to determine if the law was implemented. It 
had an additional positive effect of creating a niche market for Cambodian producers. 
Since buyers could refer to regular reports about their suppliers, those interested in 
ethical sourcing could make decisions with full information. This served to increase 
sales as such a mechanism was not in place in other low-cost countries. Though the 
Bilateral Textile Agreement and its associated monitoring requirements expired in 2005, 
interest by buyers has kept this institution in place and reports and monitoring continue 
today. 
 
The second institution-building effort focused on the Ministry of Labor. It has been 
historically underfunded and was not a ‘priority’ ministry. The resulting lack of 
bureaucratic capacity to engage in labour governance introduced a significant gap in the 
implementation of the labour law. When this author was in Cambodia there were two 
labour inspectors for hundreds of garment factories. Efforts to build capacity have had 
mixed results. In the early years following implementation, a US government official 
voiced the concern that while the Bilateral Textile Agreement was successful in 
increasing compliance, it had not increased the capacity of the Ministry of Labor to 
actually monitor.23 Rather, the job was done by a third party, which was efficient, but 
failed to embed the notion of labour rights domestically. 
 
While the Ministry of Labor continues to be beset by problems, it has made advances 
that have opened political space for workers. In particular, while it has failed to create 
the labour court provided for in the labour law, it has participated in the establishment 
of an arbitration council which has given ministry officials the skills to mediate 
collective labour disputes (for an evaluation of the its role see Adler et al. 2009). This 
council is a tripartite mechanism which hears collective disputes and issues 
jurisprudence publicly.24 According to an industry insider, the Arbitration Council is 
one of the only institutions in Cambodia that can be considered to be almost free of 
corruption. This is particularly important in a country that lacks credible and 
independent judicial institutions. The spillover potential from the Arbitration Council is 
in its ability to hear cases from all sectors of the economy. While garment factory cases 
make up the bulk of the caseload, other sectors are increasingly using this tool.  
 
The third feature of the implementation gap addressed by the BFC programme was the 
capacity of workers to engage in labour governance. Here the institution that was 
needed—collective bargaining—already existed, but was largely inaccessible to 
workers. BFC made efforts to loosen the constraints to collective bargaining. In the late 
1990s, the labour ministry would regularly block union registration and or install their 
own representatives as union officials. Through a combination of education, capacity 
building and information sharing, the BFC opened political space by allowing for 
workers to gain a voice in governance that they would otherwise not have given 
Cambodia’s slowly growing democratic tradition. Figure 6 illustrates the significant 
growth in both the number of unions and membership over the past decade. 
 
                                                 
23 Author’s interview, USTR 2005. 
24 Public information is particularly lacking in Cambodia where, as one author puts it, ‘Though there is 
no law restricting access to court judgments, they are not publically available in any form, nor are they 
available for third parties to inspect through the court registries’ (Adler 2005).   15
Figure 6: Union growth in Cambodia (1997-2007) 
 
 1998  2004  2007 
Enterprise-level unions  20  658  1203 
Union federations  4  15  28 
Membership 39,000  337,000   
 
Source: Lerner et al. (2007). Table 2. 
 
But even as union power has grown, both the government and manufacturers have 
shown that they will sometimes continue to pursue self-interest rather than tripartite 
governance. On the government side, while Shea et al. (2010) detail the role unions play 
in the monitoring process maintained by the BFC, the ITUC (2007) points out that it 
was not until 2003 that proper collective bargaining agreements were concluded in the 
garment sector. On the manufacturer’s side, after a recent living wage rally in 2010, 261 
union leaders were fired for their participation. The government, after a delay, 
advocated for their reinstatement, which factory owners largely ignored.25 
 
These three developments suggest that officially, room has been made for garment 
workers in the labour governance structure. Transparency has increased, worker 
representatives are allowed to sit at the table, and labour ministry officials are more 
highly trained and able to participate in governance rather than collusion.  
5.2  Norms of entitlement 
Officially, Cambodia’s current labour governance structure creates room for workers to 
participate. But in practical terms, are they able? If workers have not developed a sense 
of entitlement around their rights, or if their chosen vehicle for representation is 
constrained, then the de jure opening of political space is inadequate.  
 
The importance of entitlement is related for the need for empowerment. In order for 
individuals to be empowered to take advantage of the political space open to them, they 
must move beyond simply being aware of the rights afforded to them by law. It is when 
consciousness becomes a sense of entitlement that workers are more likely to become 
active participants in governance. 
 
In the late 1990s, a sense of entitlement around labour rights was clearly missing. The 
majority of factory workers, both then and now, were rural migrants who had never 
been exposed to a formal sector job. This inexperience, coupled with a Buddhism-based 
acceptance of suffering as part of life, exacerbated the susceptibility of the workforce to 
abuse and intimidation by unscrupulous managers. While today this argument sounds 
anachronistic in the early 1990s one of the tasks of the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) was to explain the meaning of ‘human rights’ to a nation that had 
never been exposed to such a concept. As the head of the Human Rights Component of 
UNTAC puts it, one of the goals of the comprehensive educational effort was to 
‘change the belief that ordinary people have no option other than to endure abuses’. 
(cited in Pokempner 1992: 23). 
                                                 
25 http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/over-200-cambodian-trade-union-leaders-suspended-or-illegally-
dismissed-after-mass-strike-ends   16
In addition to a missing sense of entitlement, the traditional vehicle for labour rights—
unions—had been largely co-opted by politics in that period. In 1997, there were 20 
registered unions in Cambodia (Sibbel 2004). At that time, the labour ministry refused 
to register unions that existed in more than one factory, which forced each new factory 
to organize alone.26 Of the 20 officially recognized unions, only one was unaffiliated 
with a political party. This suggests that registration was fast-tracked where the union 
could also act as a party mechanism. Unofficial barriers were also high as factory 
owners selected their own worker representatives, held public votes, beat up union 
activists and otherwise intimidated those workers who tried to organize unions. 
 
Awareness about labour rights spread quickly once the GSP complaint became public in 
1998. The charges made in the document and the government’s attempts to address 
them facilitated the transmission of information through NGO interest, US government 
investigations, and union activism. The international labour interest group which wrote 
the petition began to publicize it among their NGO partners. Exploratory factory 
inspections by the US embassy signaled that the allegations of worker rights violations 
were being taken seriously.  
 
And finally, existing unions, in particular those affiliated with opposition parties, used 
the petition as an organizing tool. In 1998 there were numerous worker rallies in the 
capital city of Phnom Penh where workers repeated slogans that GSP enabled factory 
managers to abuse workers. When asked by this author what GSP meant, workers were 
universally unable to define it as a tariff preference programme, but rather explained 
that it was something that enabled factory owners to benefit at their expense.27 Together 
these activities increased worker consciousness that the intimidation and abuse they 
endured during factory work did not have to be tolerated and that they could advocate 
for change.  
 
Following that period of initial unrest, the environment created by the factory 
monitoring programme appears to have built the foundations needed for awareness to 
transform into a sense of entitlement. First, in contrast to the 20 unions in 1998, today as 
Figure 6 illustrates, there are about a thousand unions organized into a number of 
confederations. These numbers suggest that unofficial barriers and factory-level 
intimidation has decreased, although political affiliation and yellow unions continue to 
be a problem. And while official barriers to union registration have clearly relaxed, 
unofficial barriers such as violence to union representatives and workplace intimidation 
remain a part of factory life.  
 
Another indicator that garment workers feel entitled to rights is that activism has 
increased, both in terms of strikes and in terms of number of cases brought before the 
Arbitration Council. As Figure 7 illustrates, the number of workers involved in strikes 
in Cambodia increased dramatically after the systematic application of the labour law 
and has continued to rise year by year. In 1998 only about 5,000 workers went on strike 
in the manufacturing sector. By 2001 (the last date for which data is available) more 
than 38,000 workers participated in strike activity. In terms of arbitration activity, in the 
                                                 
26 This was specifically aimed at the Free Trade Union of the Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia 
(FTUWKC) which was affiliated with an opposition party and maintained unions in various factory 
sites. Author’s interviews, 1998. 
27 Author’s interviews with workers at various rallies, Phnom Penh, June-August 1998.   17
first year the arbitration council heard cases, 18 were resolved. Six years later, in 2009, 
125 cases were resolved, the vast majority of which were garment factory cases.28  
 
Figure 7: Strike activity by number of workers (1997-2001) 
 
 
  Source: ILO Laborsta Database (at www.laborsta.ilo.org). 
 
The worker activism detailed here suggests that they have adopted a sense of 
entitlement to their rights. Using unions as a vehicle, garment workers have taken 
advantage of the political space open to them in the labour governance structure. 
Unionization allows workers to gain representation, strikes demonstrate their power, 
and arbitration gives them a role in how the labour law is interpreted. 
 
Yet, despite these advances, problems remain. It is not clear that the governance process 
has convinced managers, factory owners or the government that labour rights are in fact, 
a right. The 2009 US Commercial Service report on Cambodia’s business environment 
points out that labour disputes ‘may involve workers simply demanding conditions to 
which they are legally entitled’.29 And a culture of impunity for those who commit 
violence and intimidation against union officials continues. Even the most highly 
publicized cases of violence, such as the 2004 murder of prominent labour leader, Chea 
Vichea, remain unsolved due to official reluctance to pursue further investigation.30  
6  Assessing the possibility of social spillovers 
The advances made in the garment sector are significant, but cannot balance the lack of 
social protection and labour rights throughout the rest of the economy. Earlier sections 
have detailed the extent of the dichotomy. Here, we seek to understand whether the new 
political structure induced by labour rights might be used to promote other types of 
protections.  
 
On the one hand, the labour rights governance structure was not built with the intent that 
it would impact other areas. The establishment of the labour rights regime was highly 
dependent on the unique features of the garment industry. Section 4 detailed the 
                                                 
28 Specific case information available from the Arbitration Council at www.arbitrationcouncil.org.  
29 US Commercial Service (2009) Doing Business in Cambodia: 2009 Country Commercial Guide for 
US Companies. 
30 The particulars of this case were so shocking that two documentary films have been produced. Films 
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importance of brand image, export concentration, and the international quota system to 
the success of the labour rights regime.  
 
But, on the other hand, the institutions for labour governance that have been created are 
not sector specific. Collective bargaining agreements and the Arbitration Council are 
accessible to any organized labour group. In addition, emulation is possible where other 
movements identify their issues with those of the movement that offered the 
demonstration effect (McAdam et al. 2002). In this section we take a closer look at the 
two major vehicles of spillovers—overlapping communities and personnel—to see if 
and how they might extend their experience with labour rights to other sectors.  
6.1 Overlapping  communities 
Workers themselves can facilitate knowledge spillovers either sectorally by taking a job 
in a non-garment related industry, or individually by simply talking to their friends and 
neighbours about their experiences. Social movement theory has called these ‘informal 
networks of politicized individuals’ (Buechler 1990). The idea is that once a person has 
become involved in a social movement, it changes their actions in other spheres as well. 
This occurs because of a change in the individual identity of the worker, which lasts 
even beyond the conclusion of the movement that instigated it. In fact, Oberschall 
(1975) has suggested that the participants in opposition organizations will, at least in the 
early stages, be those who were previously active. 
 
There are two communities that overlap with garment workers that we might expect 
would be influenced by the labour rights movement. The first is other formal sector 
workers outside the garment industry. As garment workers move to other jobs, they 
bring their activist identity and information with them. Since worker rights education is 
one of the activities of the BFC programme, we expect that garment workers are, on the 
whole, more educated about their rights than other individuals might be. And factory 
loyalty is limited, so there is a good deal of movement among garment workers. A 
recent ILO (2010) survey reports that 49 per cent of workers surveyed had previously 
worked at a different factory. 
 
However, there are important limitations to worker-worker spillovers. While garment 
workers transfer between garment factories, it is unlikely that they will change 
industries. A survey of laid-off garment workers revealed that, of those that were not 
successful in finding new garment work, most sought low-end service industry jobs 
such as tuk-tuk drivers, food vendors, or nail-manicurists (ILO 2010). These small-scale 
jobs are often casual or informal and so there is less opportunity for knowledge transfers 
to result in activism. 
 
The profile of a typical worker in a Phnom Penh garment factory reveals the reasons 
that garment workers are unlikely to change industries easily. About 90 per cent of 
garment workers are female, and most are single, young and have recently immigrated 
from a rural area (Chandararot and Dannet 2009). Since they have limited skills and 
experience in the labour force, there are not many alternative employment opportunities 
available to them. Even with factory experience, the main group of workers is involved 
in low-skill assembly operations, which are not readily transferrable to Cambodia’s 
other growing sectors such as construction and services. 
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A second overlapping community is rural workers. Most unionized garment workers 
emigrated from rural areas and return from time to time. While garment workers do not 
often return permanently to rural areas, their contact with their families is a natural 
channel for information flows. This is important because farmers in Cambodia are a 
particularly vulnerable group. In terms of natural disasters, the number of people 
affected in Cambodia was the fourth highest in Southeast Asia from 1999-2008 (IFRC 
2009). The frequency of natural shocks is highly significant since more than half of the 
labour force is employed in single-crop agriculture where yields are dependent on the 
weather.31 
 
But while farmers have been increasingly active in their demands for government 
assistance, there yet exists little evidence that their activities are any more successful. A 
clear example of this comes from the contrast between two protests in the capital city 
and the government’s response. In August of 2011, 120 Cambodian farmers travelled to 
the capital city of Phnom Penh to pray at a temple near government offices as a protest 
gesture against land losses that threatened their livelihood. Most of them were arrested 
for handing out flyers and the government issued no official response.32 Around the 
same time the year before, tens of thousands of garment workers marched on the capital 
on strike to protest low wages. They were relatively unmolested and did not disburse 
until the government agreed to consider the matter.33 The differences illustrate the 
distance that remains to be closed.  
6.2 Shared  personnel 
Unions are another vehicle that can translate the experience with labour rights in the 
garment sector into other industries. They do this through diversification of existing 
unions to incorporate non-garment factories and through the demonstration effect 
whereby workers in non-garment industries form their own independent unions after 
observing the gains that are possible. This is the channel identified by Meyer and 
Whittier (1994) as ‘shared personnel’. Here the personnel being the union umbrella 
groups that exist. Data from Arbitration Council cases (Figure 8) reveals several 
interesting features of union-level spillovers. 
 
The first observation is that non-garment industries are organizing unions that are active 
in arbitration. While the vast majority of cases brought to arbitration are from garment 
factories, an average of 12 per cent of cases each year come from non-garment sectors. 
Many of these are in related industries, such as footwear and printing, which suggests 
that existing unions are diversifying their activities using the skills they gained in 
organizing garment workers. This is confirmed by a look at which union groups are 
most active in bringing cases to the Arbitration Council. Many of them, such as the Free 
Trade Union of the Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia (FTUWKC) had their roots 
in the garment sector.  
 
                                                 
31 In the years around 2007, Cambodia was hit with droughts, typhoons and floods which disrupted 
crops and led to the spread of hunger, disease and loss of food stocks. 
32 http://www.voanews.com/khmer-english/news/social-issues/Cambodia-Villagers-Stage-Avatar-
Themed-Protest-about-Land--Loss-128030568.html 
33 http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/19/world/la-fg-cambodia-garment-strike-20100919   20
Figure 8: Arbitration Council Cases (by sector) 2003-0934 
 
  Source: Arbitration Council Arbitral Awards, author’s assessment. 
 
 
The second observation is that the service sector constitutes a significant proportion of 
the non-garment cases for most years. Interestingly, the unions or workers who bring 
these cases to the arbitration are largely independent of the larger union federations. Or 
they are members of the tourism federation. This indicates that these unions were not 
the result of diversification of existing groups away from garments, but are in fact a 
different entity altogether. This suggests that there have been knowledge spillovers into 
other sectors from the observation of the experience of garments. 
 
The fact that the service sector has been able to build up active unions may be the result 
of its interaction with customers who are more aware and interested in labour rights than 
domestic consumers. Adler et al. (2009) suggests that interaction with international 
clientele is particularly important for the tourism industry. Among domestic consumers, 
labour rights may be seen as a luxury good, whereas among world travellers, it is a basic 
right. This was clearly a driver for the garment sector, but may not exist in other sectors. 
As The Economist (2010) reported recently, in consumer surveys about wood products 
that ‘barely a third of customers would pay a premium of 2 per cent for a certified 
product’. 
 
The third observation is that the diversity of sectors bringing cases to the Arbitration 
Council remains small. This reminds us that while spillovers are possible and appear to 
be occuring, without the facilitation of outside interest, employer resistance and official 
obstruction still plays a large role in preventing the spread of worker protection. The 
construction industry is one where we might expect unions would form naturally—it is a 
highly dangerous profession where a worker can take home higher than the minimum 
wage, but is also subject to working in conditions where death from falls, machinery 
and electric shocks are common (Phnom Penh Post 2007; AFP 2008). Yet there have 
been only limited inroads made by the Cambodian Construction Workers Trade Union 
Federation. Even where their work is highly visible to international groups, such as in 
                                                 
34 Data is available from 2003-10, however, for 2009 and 2010 most reports are only available in 
















the restoration of the Angkor Wat complex, employers have refused to recognize unions 
(ITUC 2009).  
 
Official obstruction to union registration has become more complex as the government 
has implemented greater transparency in the registration process. Yet it has still been 
able to prevent organizations such as the Cambodian Independent Teachers Association 
from concluding collective bargaining agreements on behalf of its members. Though 
this union has been active for many years, the government will not register it as an 
official union.35  
 
These observations suggest that the experience of the garment sector has had some 
important impacts on other parts of the economy. Unions have built out from their 
garment sector roots to encompass related industries. And new sectors have learned 
from the garment sector and established their own independent union groups. Most 
importantly, these unions are active in the Arbitration Council which suggests that 
labour rights are not just understood, but increasingly, being demanded. 
 
While the expansion of labour rights has been slow but steady, attempts to diversify 
entitlement to other types of social protection have been less successful. The BFC 
programme has attempted to include social protection training in its educational 
component for example. The life-cycle approach to the education process includes 
education on more general social issues such as HIV/AIDS, entrepreneurial activities, 
and health initiatives. While health initiatives are seen as beneficial for both employers 
and workers, there has been official resistance to some of the life skills activities. This 
reminds us that the major roadblock to social protection expansion and diffusion 
remains the lack of understanding that social protection improves development 
indicators in the long run.  
7 Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to address a missing link in the design of social 
protection systems in fragile states. Fragile states present additional challenges in terms 
of government capacity, political instability, conflict and weak financing capabilities. 
Efforts to build social protection systems under these conditions have focused almost 
exclusively on supply-side constraints. A recent report recommended suggested that a 
sustainable system would be promoted by expanding the range of instruments, 
harmonizing donor financing, and engaging with non-state actors for delivery (Harvey 
et al. 2007). To these, we would add the creation of spaces and opportunities for the 
expression of domestic demand. 
 
A sustainable social protection system must ultimately be driven by domestic demand. 
In the short run, government decisions about social spending may be influenced by 
foreign assistance or by the idiosyncratic preferences of the ruling elite. But because of 
the redistributive nature of social protection, neither source of influence will guarantee a 
stable programme in the long run.  
 
The demand component of social protection has been ignored for a number of reasons. 
Not least of them is the fact that the dynamics of social movements in fragile states are 
                                                 
35 It is instead registered as a civic association by the Ministry of the Interior.    22
poorly understood and weakly conceptualized. It is here where the Cambodia case 
presented in this paper can provide some important insight. There are four lessons about 
how political space for social protection demand operates.  
 
The first lesson is that there can be positive productivity impacts of social protection.36 
An early concern for the Cambodian government was that enforcing labour rights would 
raise costs in the sector to the point where it was no longer competitive. But rather than 
shedding jobs, firms created a niche, productivity improved. Having an example for 
governments that social protection can be resource-enhancing can remove some 
reservations governments have about allowing the creation of spaces for demand.  
 
The second lesson is that links to international markets and consumers may offer an 
important source of leverage over a reluctant government. In fragile states, active 
attention by actors that are not subject to government coercion or repression may be an 
important catalyst. For labour rights, the global justice movement had an important 
leveraging effect on an otherwise unwilling government. For services in high end hotels, 
pressure comes from foreign clients. While labour and environment are two areas where 
external actors have had important impacts, the literature on social movements is 
positive about the role they can have in other areas (see e.g. Della Porta and Diani 
2006). 
 
The next two lessons are related to the fungibility of political space. A third lesson is 
that—even where governments are unsupportive—the demonstration effect of a single 
victory can activate social movements in other sectors. The importance of early quick 
wins in fragile states is already well-established. In terms of social protection, this 
suggests that visible sectors, or those with links across the country, may be the most 
effective way to start building networks that can sustain the system in the future.  
 
The final lesson is that the natural linkages among activists can be used to spread 
information about entitlements which further cements the space that exists. In the case 
of Cambodia the links between farmers and garment workers for example was clear 
from the analysis, but has not been exploited. 
 
The story we tell here about the role of political opportunities underscores a more 
fundamental message about state-society relations in fragile states. Open and inclusive 
relations can be a key driver of functioning democratic systems, stability, and poverty 
reduction. Thus by promoting the creation of political spaces available to interest groups 
in fragile states, donors can amplify the positive impacts of foreign assistance in these 
areas. Supply-side constraints in social protection are critical, but solutions should also 
pay attention to sustainability.  
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